Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Bibliography by Volume #
Volumes 1-11(2)
[ 1(1) | 1(2) | 2(1) | 2(2) | 3(1) | 3(2) | 4(1) | 4(2) | 5(1) | 5(2) ]
Volume 1(1)
A. T. Kronman
Contract Law and the State of Nature.
1(1): 5-32.
P. L. Joskow
Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants.
1(1): 33-80.
J. L. Mashaw
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions.
1(1): 81-100.
B. D. Baysinger and H. N. Butler
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition.
1(1): 101-24.
H. Hansmann
The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock.
1(1): 125-53.
T. M. Palay
Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements.
1(1): 155-75.
O. E. Williamson
Assessing Contract.
1(1): 177-208.
P. Harris
Difficult Cases and the Display of Authority.
1(1): 209-21.
Volume 1(2)
R. Romano
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle.
1(2): 225-83.
P. T. Spiller
On Vertical Mergers.
1(2): 285-312.
E. D. Elliott, B. A. Ackerman and J. C. Millian
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law.
1(2): 313-40.
A. Sen
Goals, Commitment, and Identity.
1(2): 341-55.
T. C. Schelling
Enforcing Rules on Oneself.
1(2): 357-74.
G. C. Winston
The Reasons for Being of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself.".
1(2): 375-79.
R. A. Burt
Enforcing Rules on Oneself: Commentary.
1(2): 381-83.
J. M. Acheson
The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy.
1(2): 385-98.
Volume 2(1)
M. J. Graetz, J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde
The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement.
2(1): 1-32.
M. P. Fiorina
Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power.
2(1): 33-51.
R. H. Kraakman
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy.
2(1): 53-104.
J. H. Mulherin
Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions.
2(1): 105-17.
H. Hansmann
A Theory of Status Organizations.
2(1): 119-30.
S. Rose Ackerman
Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?
2(1): 131-61.
K. F. Forbes
Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation.
2(1): 163-77.
Volume 2(2)
J. Tirole
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations.
2(2): 181-214.
V. Vanberg and J. M. Buchanan
Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt.
2(2): 215-27.
A. Schwartz
Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction.
2(2): 229-53.
L. A. Bebchuk
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply [The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer] [Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers].
2(2): 253-71.
A. Schwartz
Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods.
2(2): 271-77.
R. Craswell and J. E. Calfee
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards.
2(2): 279-303.
A. Gifford, Jr. and R. W. Kenney
The Production of Information through Labor Market Contests.
2(2): 305-13.
G. M. Grossman and C. Shapiro
Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis.
2(2): 315-37.
B. D. Baysinger and A. Zardkoohi
Technology, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control.
2(2): 339-49.
Volume 3(1)
S. N. Wiggins and G. D. Libecap
Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil.
3(1): 1-25.
A. M. Polinsky
Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation.
3(1): 27-46.
C. E. Helfat and D. J. Teece
Vertical Integration and Risk Reduction.
3(1): 47-67.
D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser
Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of Government Regulation.
3(1): 69-98.
J. H. Mulherin and W. J. Muller, III
Volatile Interest Rates and the Divergence of Incentives in Mortgage Contracts.
3(1): 99-115.
E. C. Gallick and D. E. Sisk
A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation.
3(1): 117-28.
B. V. Yarbrough and R. M. Yarbrough
Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade.
3(1): 129-39.
R. Higgs
Identity and Cooperation: A Comment on Sen's Alternative Program [Goals, Commitment, and Identity].
3(1): 140-42.
Volume 3(2)
A. Katz
Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?
3(2): 143-76.
R. Bowles
Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?
3(2): 177-84.
C. R. Plott
Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules.
3(2): 185-92.
G. L. Priest
Measuring Legal Change.
3(2): 193-225.
R. Cooter
Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change.".
3(2): 227-34.
M. Galanter
Conceptualizing Legal Change and Its Effects: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change.".
3(2): 235-41.
M. D. McCubbins, R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.
3(2): 243-77.
R. D. Arnold
Political Control of Administrative Officials.
3(2): 279-86.
T. W. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel
Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.
3(2): 287-335.
M. P. Fiorina
Comment: Alternative Rationales for Restrictive Procedures [Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures].
3(2): 337-43.
M. Shapiro
The Concept of Information: A Comment on Gilligan and Krehbiel's "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees.".
3(2): 345-50.
R. S. Hartman and M. J. Doane
The Use of Hedonic Analysis for Certification and Damage Calculations in Class Action Complaints.
3(2): 351-72.
G. John, A. M. Weiss and B. Weitz
An Organizational Coordination Model of Salesforce Compensation Plans: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test.
3(2): 373-95.
A. F. Daughety and R. Forsythe
The Effects of Industry-Wide Price Regulation on Industrial Organization.
3(2): 397-434.
R. Wintrobe
The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political Control.
3(2): 435-48.
Volume 4(1)
R. H. Coase
The Nature of the Firm: Orgin.
4(1): 3-17.
R. H. Coase
The Nature of the Firm: Meaning.
4(1): 19-32.
R. H. Coase
The Nature of the Firm: Influence.
4(1): 33-47.
S. Rosen
Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets.
4(1): 49-64.
O. E. Williamson
The Logic of Economic Organization.
4(1): 65-93.
P. L. Joskow
Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence.
4(1): 95-117.
O. D. Hart
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm.
4(1): 119-39.
H. Demsetz
The Theory of the Firm Revisited.
4(1): 141-61.
S. G. Winter
On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation.
4(1): 163-80.
S. E. Masten
A Legal Basis for the Firm.
4(1): 181-98.
B. Klein
Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited.
4(1): 199-213.
Volume 4(1)
J. A. Dubin and P. Navarro
How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection.
4(2): 217-41.
M. J. Trebilcock
The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules.
4(2): 243-65.
H. Hansmann
Ownership of the Firm.
4(2): 267-304.
H. Gatignon and E. Anderson
The Multinational Corporation's Degree of Control over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation.
4(2): 305-36.
G. John and B. A. Weitz
Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis.
4(2): 337-55.
A. Marcus and P. Bromiley
The Rationale for Regulation: Shareholder Losses under Various Assumptions about Managerial Cognition.
4(2): 357-72.
M. Ryngaert and J. M. Netter
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law.
4(2): 373-83.
J. B. Baker
Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies.
4(2): 385-408.
Volume 5(1)
S. Klepper and D. Nagin
The Anatomy of Tax Evasion.
5(1): 1-24.
D. Besanko and D. F. Spulber
Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior.
5(1): 25-52.
R. N. Johnson and G. D. Libecap
Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal Government.
5(1): 53-82.
R. C. Ellickson
A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry.
5(1): 83-97.
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell
Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law.
5(1): 99-108.
G. P. Pisano
Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry.
5(1): 109-26.
J. F. Hennart
The Transaction-Cost Rationale for Countertrade.
5(1): 127-53.
T. H. Hammond and P. A. Thomas
The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy.
5(1): 155-84.
W. K. Viscusi
The Interaction between Product Liability and Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries.
5(1): 185-210.
S. J. La Croix
Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity?
5(1): 211-22.
Volume 5(2)
G. A. Jarrell and A. B. Poulsen
Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation?
5(2): 225-48.
C. Grandy
Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888.
5(2): 249-69.
C. R. Knoeber
A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers.
5(2): 271-92.
J. R. Lott, Jr. and G. M. Fremling
Time Dependent Information Costs, Price Controls, and Successive Government Intervention.
5(2): 293-306.
R. B. Ekelund, Jr., R. F. Hebert and R. D. Tollison
An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking.
5(2): 307-31.
J. E. L. Campos
Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice.
5(2): 333-53.
W. R. Reed
Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing.
5(2): 355-74.
D. Choi, S. Kamma and J. Weintrop
The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder Wealth.
5(2): 375-93.
E. Berkovitch, M. Bradley and N. Khanna
Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare.
5(2): 395-412.
A. Schwartz
Defensive Tactics and Optimal Search.
5(2): 413-24.