Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Bibliography by Volume #
Volumes 1-11(2)
[ 6(S) | 6(1) | 6(2) | 7(S) | 7(1) | 7(2) | 8(1) | 8(2) | 8(3) | 9(1) | 9(2) | 10(1) | 10(2) ]
Volume 6(S)
J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy.
6(S): 1-20.
S. Rose Ackerman
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy: Comment.
6(S): 21-27.
M. L. Spitzer
Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of Administrative Agency Behavior.
6(S): 29-43.
K. Shepsle and B. Nalebuff
The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups.
6(S): 45-72.
K. Krehbiel
Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing Groups.
6(S): 73-77.
R. P. Inman and M. A. Fitts
Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record.
6(S): 79-132.
M. D. McCubbins
Budget Policy-Making and the Appearance of Power: Note.
6(S): 133-53.
W. P. Rogerson
Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record: Comment.
6(S): 155-66.
M. E. Levine and J. L. Forrence
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis.
6(S): 167-98.
R. A. Katzmann
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis: Comments.
6(S): 199-202.
M. D. McCubbins, R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast
Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy.
6(S): 203-12.
T. M. Moe
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story.
6(S): 213-53.
M. P. Fiorina
The Problems with PPT: Comment.
6(S): 255-61.
O. E. Williamson
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story--Comment.
6(S): 263-66.
J. L. Mashaw
Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development.
6(S): 267-98.
C. R. Sunstein
Political Economy, Administrative Law: A Comment.
6(S): 299-306.
M. D. McCubbins, R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast
Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures.
6(S): 307-32.
Volume 6(1)
J. J. Laffont and J. Tirole
The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions.
6(1): 1-31.
J. Bendor and D. Mookherjee
Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation.
6(1): 33-63.
E. Rasmusen and T. Zenger
Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts.
6(1): 65-92.
L. Kaplow
Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions.
6(1): 93-128.
A. V. Thakor
Investment "Myopia" and the Internal Organization of Capital Allocation Decisions.
6(1): 129-54.
S. N. Wiggins
The Comparative Advantage of Long-term Contracts and Firms.
6(1): 155-70.
J. S. Ferris
Time, Space, and Shopping: The Regulation of Shopping Hours.
6(1): 171-87.
T. J. Miceli
Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain.
6(1): 189-201.
M. F. Brinig
Rings and Promises.
6(1): 203-15.
E. W. Kitch
The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?
6(1): 217-33.
D. G. Margotta, T. P. McWilliams and V. B. McWilliams
An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation.
6(1): 235-51.
M. Ryngaert and J. Netter
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects.
6(1): 253-62.
Volume 6(2)
R. Gely and P. T. Spiller
A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases.
6(2): 263-300.
J. J. Laffont
Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy.
6(2): 301-24.
D. F. Spulber
Auctions and Contract Enforcement.
6(2): 325-44.
E. A. Snyder and J. W. Hughes
The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory.
6(2): 345-80.
P. Aghion and B. Hermalin
Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency.
6(2): 381-409.
D. Mookherjee and I. P. L. Png
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Progressivity of Income Taxes.
6(2): 410-31.
K. N. Hylton
Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence.
6(2): 433-52.
L. M. B. Cabral and S. Greenstein
Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement of Computer Systems.
6(2): 453-69.
Volume 7(S)
K. J. Arrow
Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organizations.
7(S): pages 1-6.
J. S. Coleman
Constructed Organization: First Principles.
7(S): pages 7-23.
B. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.
7(S): pages 24-52.
P. L. Joskow
The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies.
7(S): pages 53-83.
J. J. Laffont and J. Tirole
Privatization and Incentives.
7(S): pages 84-105.
T. M. Moe
Politics and the Theory of Organization.
7(S): pages 106-29.
T. Petersen
Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages.
7(S): pages 130-58.
O. E. Williamson
Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance.
7(S): pages 159-87.
Volume 7(1)
S. E. Masten, J. W. Meehan, Jr. and E. A. Snyder
The Costs of Organization.
7(1): 1-25.
P. Cramton and A. Schwartz
Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation.
7(1): 27-53.
R. Romano
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?
7(1): 55-87.
J. M. Ramseyer
Indentured Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry.
7(1): 89-116.
T. P. Murtha
Surviving Industrial Targeting: State Credibility and Public Policy Contingencies in Multinational Subcontracting.
7(1): 117-43.
R. N. Johnson and A. M. Parkman
Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate.
7(1): 145-62.
J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde
Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners.
7(1): 163-81.
M. A. Cohen
Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?
7(1): 183-99.
Volume 7(2)
B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole
Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form.
7(2): 201-28.
M. Bagnoli and M. McKee
Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus.
7(2): 229-47.
R. T. S. Ramakrishnan and A. V. Thakor
Cooperation versus Competition in Agency.
7(2): 248-83.
L. A. Bebchuk and S. Shavell
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley vs. Baxendale.
7(2): 284-312.
D. C. Mueller
Constitutional Rights.
7(2): 313-33.
D. D. Haddock and F. S. McChesney
Bargaining Costs, Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules.
7(2): 334-54.
J. S. Heywood
Imports and Domestic Wages: Is the Relationship Consistent with Expense Preference Behavior?
7(2): 355-72.
J. S. Hill and J. E. Brazier
Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis.
7(2): 373-400.
B. O'Flaherty and A. Siow
Promotion Lotteries.
7(2): 401-09.
J. S. Jahera, Jr. and W. N. Pugh
State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware.
7(2): 410-28.
Volume 8(1)
P. T. Spiller and J. Ferejohn
The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction.
8(1): 1-17.
P. T. Spiller and M. L. Spitzer
Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines.
8(1): 8-46.
R. Romano
Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines: Comment.
8(1): 47-58.
D. A. Farber
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law.
8(1): 59-81.
T. S. Ulen
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law: Comments.
8(1): 82-89.
J. M. Snyder, Jr.
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law: Comments.
8(1): 90-92.
J. R. Macey
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies.
8(1): 93-110.
K. A. Shepsle
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: A Comment: Bureaucratic Drift, Coalition Drift, and Time Consistency.
8(1): 111-18.
M. E. Levine
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: Comment.
8(1): 119-25.
D. F. Spulber and D. Besanko
Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate.
8(1): 126-54.
S. F. Ross
Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comment.
8(1): 155-58.
L. Arvan
Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comments.
8(1): 159-64.
W. N. Eskridge, Jr. and J. Ferejohn
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State.
8(1): 165-89.
J. Knight
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: Positive Models and Normative Theory.
8(1): 190-96.
D. B. Rodriguez
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: The Administrative State and the Original Understanding.
8(1): 197-204.
P. L. Strauss and A. R. Rutten
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Response: The Game of Politics and Law.
8(1): 205-13.
Volume 8(2)
E. P. Schwartz
Policy, Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court Decision-Making.
8(2): 219-52.
L. A. Bebchuk and H. F. Chang
Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization.
8(2): 253-79.
T. Y. Chung
On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis.
8(2): 280-305.
L. Kaplow and S. Shavell
Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice.
8(2): 306-20.
H. Itoh
Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective.
8(2): 321-45.
P. V. Fishback
The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields.
8(2): 346-65.
D. W. Allen and D. Lueck
The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts.
8(2): 366-76.
E. Gal Or
Vertical Integration in Oligopoly.
8(2): 377-93.
J. Nelson
Defining the Deal: Legislative Bargaining and the Chevron Decision.
8(2): 394-410.
J. H. Arlen
Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses.
8(2): 411-26.
D. T. Levy and J. D. Reitzes
Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition.
8(2): 427-40.
Volume 8(3)
L. A. Kornhauser
Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine.
8(3): 441-70.
N. T. Gallini and N. A. Lutz
Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising.
8(3): 471-501.
M. J. Meurer
The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflict between Defendants and Liability Insurers.
8(3): 502-22.
P. Aghion, O. Hart and J. Moore
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform.
8(3): 523-46.
D. Soskice, R. H. Bates and D. Epstein
Ambition and Constraint: The Stabilizing Role of Institutions.
8(3): 547-60.
S. Helper and D. I. Levine
Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure.
8(3): 561-81.
L. A. Stole
The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information.
8(3): 582-606.
L. A. Craig and C. R. Knoeber
Manager Shareholding, the Market for Managers, and the End-Period Problem: Evidence from the U.S. Whaling Industry.
8(3): 607-27.
H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman
Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt.
8(3): 628-55.
J. Pound
On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law.
8(3): 656-72.
B. Steunenberg
Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy-Making.
8(3): 673-94.
Volume 9(1)
D. Besanko and D. F. Spulber
Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy.
9(1): 1-29.
A. Ziv
Performance Measures and Optimal Organization.
9(1): 30-50.
M. Rabin
Information and the Control of Productive Assets.
9(1): 51-76.
A. Katz
Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?
9(1): 77-97.
W. P. Barnett and G. R. Carroll
How Institutional Constraints Affected the Organization of Early U.S. Telephony.
9(1): 98-126.
B. E. Hermalin
Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects.
9(1): 127-35.
T. E. Olsen and G. Torsvik
The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization.
9(1): 136-58.
S. Greenstein
Procedural Rules and Procurement Regulations: Complexity Creates Trade-offs.
9(1): 159-80.
H. C. Wolf
Endogenous Legal Booms.
9(1): 181-87.
C. R. Taylor
Delivery-Contingent Contracts for Research.
9(1): 188-203.
Volume 9(2)
M. I. Kamien and I. Zang
Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition.
9(2): 205-29.
B. E. Hermalin, M. L. Katz and O. pages
Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach.
9(2): 230-255.
F. Lafontaine
Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising.
9(2): 256-89.
J. F. Hennart and E. Anderson
Countertrade and the Minimization of Transaction Costs: An Empirical Examination.
9(2): 290-313.
A. F. Daughety and J. F. Reinganum
Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation.
9(2): 314-48.
J. D. Dana, Jr. and K. E. Spier
Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation.
9(2): 349-67.
M. Kahan
Sales of Corporate Control.
9(2): 368-79.
T. P. Lyon and S. C. Hackett
Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas.
9(2): 380-98.
Y. K. Che and J. G. Yi
The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation.
9(2): 399-424.
M. G. Hertzel, J. K. Smith and T. Pennzoil v
Industry Effects of Interfirm Lawsuits: Evidence from.
9(2): 425-44.
Volume 10(1)
D. J. Aron and P. Olivella
Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems.
10(1): 1-34.
M. F. Ferguson
Ownership Structure, Potential Competition, and the Free-Rider Problem in Tender Offers.
10(1): 35-62.
E. Rasmusen
Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game.
10(1): 63-83.
K. E. Spier
Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards.
10(1): 84-95.
A. Lupia and M. D. McCubbins
Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed.
10(1): 96-125.
J. M. Ferris and E. Graddy
Organizational Choices for Public Service Supply.
10(1): 126-41.
S. N. Kaplan
Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany.
10(1): 142-59.
P. A. Huxtable
Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model.
10(1): 160-67.
A. Watts
Bargaining through an Expert Attorney.
10(1): 168-86.
G. H. Wang, J. Y. Kim and J. G. Yi
Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information.
10(1): 187-200.
Volume 10(2)
B. Levy and P. T. Spiller
The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation.
10(2): 201-46.
E. Berglof
A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance.
10(2): 247-67.
M. J. White
Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganization and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings.
10(2): 268-95.
D. P. O'Brien and G. Shaffer
The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis of Robinson-Patman.
10(2): 296-318.
J. Schrag and S. Scotchmer
Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials.
10(2): 319-42.
M. L. Davis
The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes.
10(2): 343-59.
S. C. Hackett
Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contract?
10(2): 360-89.
P. H. Huang and H.-M. Wu
More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures.
10(2): 390-406.
G. J. Werden and L. M. Froeb
The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy.
10(2): 407-26.
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell
Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?
10(2): 427-37.