Research in Law and Economics

Research in Law and Economics

Bibliography by Volume #

Volumes 1-16

[ 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 ]  

Volume 11

R. O. Zerbe Jr. and N. Urban

Including the Public Interest in Theories of Regulation.

11: 1-24.

W. J. Talbott

Cost Spreading and Benefit Spreading in Tort Law.

11: 25-52.

P. Heyne

The Foundations of Law and of Economics: Can Blind Lead the Blind.

11: 53-72.

L. J. White

Litigation and Economic Incentives.

11: 73-90.

P. C. Mayer

The Theory of Political Patronage.

11: 91-112.

D. Schap

Pricing and Property Rights in Government Enterprises: Some Dynamic Aspects.

11: 113-28.

C. F. Rule

Introduction to : A History of the Antitrust Laws of Vertical Practices.

11: 129-32.

J. E. Fortenberry

A History of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Practices.

11: 133-260.

 

Volume 12

A. M. Polinsky and D. L. Rubinfeld

A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlement and Litigation Costs.

12: 1-8.

L. E. Wolcher

Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.

12: 9-32.

D. E. Ault and G. L. Rutman

Land Scarcity, Economic Efficiency, and African Common Law.

12: 33-54.

P. L. Hersch and J. M. Netter

State Prohibitions of Alcohol: An Application of Diffusion Analysis to Regulation.

12: 55-70.

A. A. Fleisher III, W. F. Shughart II and R. D. Tollison

Ownership Structure in Professional Sports.

12: 71-76.

A. Mathios and M. Plummer

The Regulation of Advertising by the Federal Trade Commission: Capital Market Effects.

12: 77-94.

D. J. Salazar

Regulatory Policies and Environment: State Regulation of Logging Practices.

12: 95-118.

K. Kelly

Can Imports Injure a Domestic Industry When They Decline?

12: 119-30.

J. A. Lesser

The Economics of Preference Power.

12: 131-52.

D. L. Weisman

Optimal Re-Contracting, Market Risk and the Regulated Firm in Competitive Transition.

12: 153-72.

W. E. Kovacic

Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases.

12: 173-206.

B. C. Harris and J. J. Simons

Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?

12: 207-26.

F. I. Johnson

Two Approaches to Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines.

12: 227-34.

F. I. Johnson

Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines: Critical Demand Elasticities.

12: 235-46.

H. J. Levin

Regulating the Global Commons: A Case Study.

12: 247-66.

B. T. Yu

The Delineation of Rights on Technology Transfer.

12: 267-78.

 

Volume 13

F. F. Heimann

The Electric Policy Study.

13: 1-6.

R. J. Pierce Jr.

Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electric Industry.

13: 7-56.

J. P. Kalt

Comment on Pierce.

13: 57-62.

P. L. Joskow

The Evolution of an Independent Power Sector and Competitive Procurement of New Generating Capacity.

13: 63-100.

V. P. Goldberg

Comment on Joskow.

13: 101-04.

C. G. Stalon

The Significance of the FERC's Transmission Task Force Report in the Evolution of the Electric Industry.

13: 105-50.

R. T. Smith

Comment on Stalon.

13: 151-60.

K. A. McCabe, S. J. Rassenti and V. L. Smith

Experimental Research on Deregulated Markets for Natural Gas Pipeline and Electric Power Transmission Networks.

13: 161-90.

T. H. Lee and F. J. Ellert

Technical Implication of our Regulatory Structure.

13: 191-212.

R. J. Michaels

Comment on Lee and Ellert.

13: 213-20.

A. E. Kahn

The Changing Focus of Electric Utility Regulation.

13: 221-.

 

Volume 14

D. W. Allen

What are Transaction Costs?

14: 1-18.

J. R. Macey, M. W. Marr and S. D. Young

The Glass-Steagall Act and the Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries.

14: 19-30.

V. P. Goldberg

The International Salt Puzzle.

14: 31-50.

A. De Vany and R. D. Eckert

Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount Cases Revisited.

14: 51-112.

J. C. Hilke

Mandatory Government Investment "Advice": The Effects on Investors of State Merit Regulation of Mutual Funds and Common Stocks.

14: 113-90.

J. Bilmes and J. Woodbury

Deterrence and Justice: Setting Civil Penalties in the Federal Trade Commission.

14: 191-222.

A. E. Boardman and A. R. Vining

The Behavior of Mixed Enterprises.

14: 223-50.

W. F. Shughart II and M. S. Kimenyi

A Public Choicer Analysis of Public Transit Operating Subsidies.

14: 251-76.

 

Volume 15

P. C. Carstensen

The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis.

15: 1-88.

A. R. Dick

Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or Monopoly-Promoting? Evidence from the Webb-Pomerene Experience.

15: 89-128.

A. L. Kolbe and W. B. Tye

The Fair Allowed Rate of Return with Regulatory Risk.

15: 129-70.

R. J. Pierce Jr.

Placing the Duquesne Opinion in a Political Framework.

15: 171-82.

 

Volume 16

V. P. Goldberg

Litigation Costs Under Strict Liability and Negligence.

16: 1-16.

A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell

A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmental Harmful Discharges.

16: 17-24.

J. C. Gallo, K. G. Dau-Schmidt, J. L. Craycraft and C. J. Parker

Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and Economics.

16: 25-72.

M. B. Coate and A. N. Kleit

Exclusion, Collusion or Confusion? The Underpinnings of Raising Rival's Costs.

16: 73-94.

R. A. Collinge

An Alternative to Regulation: Efficiency and Second-Best Optimal Revenues Irrespective of Market Structure.

16: 95-108.

J. D. Jones, C. L. Jones and F. Phillips-Patrick

Estimating the Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.

16: 109-50.

R. C. Marshall, M. J. Meurer and J. F. Richard

Multiple Litigants with a Public Good Remedy.

16: 151-74.

S. F. Gohmann and R. L. Ohsfeldt

U.S. Senate Voting on Abortion-Legislation: A More Direct Test for Ideological Shirking.

16: 175-96.

T. J. Miceli

Prison and Parole: Minimizing the Cost of Non-Monetary Sanctions as Deterrents.

16: 197-212.

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