Volumes 1-16
Including the Public Interest in Theories of Regulation.
11: 1-24.
W. J. Talbott
Cost Spreading and Benefit Spreading in Tort Law.
11: 25-52.
P. Heyne
The Foundations of Law and of Economics: Can Blind Lead the Blind.
11: 53-72.
L. J. White
Litigation and Economic Incentives.
11: 73-90.
P. C. Mayer
The Theory of Political Patronage.
11: 91-112.
D. Schap
Pricing and Property Rights in Government Enterprises: Some Dynamic Aspects.
11: 113-28.
C. F. Rule
Introduction to : A History of the Antitrust Laws of Vertical Practices.
11: 129-32.
J. E. Fortenberry
A History of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Practices.
11: 133-260.
A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlement and Litigation Costs.
12: 1-8.
L. E. Wolcher
Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.
12: 9-32.
D. E. Ault and G. L. Rutman
Land Scarcity, Economic Efficiency, and African Common Law.
12: 33-54.
P. L. Hersch and J. M. Netter
State Prohibitions of Alcohol: An Application of Diffusion Analysis to Regulation.
12: 55-70.
A. A. Fleisher III, W. F. Shughart II and R. D. Tollison
Ownership Structure in Professional Sports.
12: 71-76.
A. Mathios and M. Plummer
The Regulation of Advertising by the Federal Trade Commission: Capital Market Effects.
12: 77-94.
D. J. Salazar
Regulatory Policies and Environment: State Regulation of Logging Practices.
12: 95-118.
K. Kelly
Can Imports Injure a Domestic Industry When They Decline?
12: 119-30.
J. A. Lesser
The Economics of Preference Power.
12: 131-52.
D. L. Weisman
Optimal Re-Contracting, Market Risk and the Regulated Firm in Competitive Transition.
12: 153-72.
W. E. Kovacic
Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases.
12: 173-206.
B. C. Harris and J. J. Simons
Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?
12: 207-26.
F. I. Johnson
Two Approaches to Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines.
12: 227-34.
F. I. Johnson
Market Definition Under the Merger Guidelines: Critical Demand Elasticities.
12: 235-46.
H. J. Levin
Regulating the Global Commons: A Case Study.
12: 247-66.
B. T. Yu
The Delineation of Rights on Technology Transfer.
12: 267-78.
The Electric Policy Study.
13: 1-6.
R. J. Pierce Jr.
Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electric Industry.
13: 7-56.
J. P. Kalt
Comment on Pierce.
13: 57-62.
P. L. Joskow
The Evolution of an Independent Power Sector and Competitive Procurement of New Generating Capacity.
13: 63-100.
V. P. Goldberg
Comment on Joskow.
13: 101-04.
C. G. Stalon
The Significance of the FERC's Transmission Task Force Report in the Evolution of the Electric Industry.
13: 105-50.
R. T. Smith
Comment on Stalon.
13: 151-60.
K. A. McCabe, S. J. Rassenti and V. L. Smith
Experimental Research on Deregulated Markets for Natural Gas Pipeline and Electric Power Transmission Networks.
13: 161-90.
T. H. Lee and F. J. Ellert
Technical Implication of our Regulatory Structure.
13: 191-212.
R. J. Michaels
Comment on Lee and Ellert.
13: 213-20.
A. E. Kahn
The Changing Focus of Electric Utility Regulation.
13: 221-.
What are Transaction Costs?
14: 1-18.
J. R. Macey, M. W. Marr and S. D. Young
The Glass-Steagall Act and the Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries.
14: 19-30.
V. P. Goldberg
The International Salt Puzzle.
14: 31-50.
A. De Vany and R. D. Eckert
Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount Cases Revisited.
14: 51-112.
J. C. Hilke
Mandatory Government Investment "Advice": The Effects on Investors of State Merit Regulation of Mutual Funds and Common Stocks.
14: 113-90.
J. Bilmes and J. Woodbury
Deterrence and Justice: Setting Civil Penalties in the Federal Trade Commission.
14: 191-222.
A. E. Boardman and A. R. Vining
The Behavior of Mixed Enterprises.
14: 223-50.
W. F. Shughart II and M. S. Kimenyi
A Public Choicer Analysis of Public Transit Operating Subsidies.
14: 251-76.
The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis.
15: 1-88.
A. R. Dick
Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or Monopoly-Promoting? Evidence from the Webb-Pomerene Experience.
15: 89-128.
A. L. Kolbe and W. B. Tye
The Fair Allowed Rate of Return with Regulatory Risk.
15: 129-70.
R. J. Pierce Jr.
Placing the Duquesne Opinion in a Political Framework.
15: 171-82.
Litigation Costs Under Strict Liability and Negligence.
16: 1-16.
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell
A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmental Harmful Discharges.
16: 17-24.
J. C. Gallo, K. G. Dau-Schmidt, J. L. Craycraft and C. J. Parker
Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and Economics.
16: 25-72.
M. B. Coate and A. N. Kleit
Exclusion, Collusion or Confusion? The Underpinnings of Raising Rival's Costs.
16: 73-94.
R. A. Collinge
An Alternative to Regulation: Efficiency and Second-Best Optimal Revenues Irrespective of Market Structure.
16: 95-108.
J. D. Jones, C. L. Jones and F. Phillips-Patrick
Estimating the Costs of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.
16: 109-50.
R. C. Marshall, M. J. Meurer and J. F. Richard
Multiple Litigants with a Public Good Remedy.
16: 151-74.
S. F. Gohmann and R. L. Ohsfeldt
U.S. Senate Voting on Abortion-Legislation: A More Direct Test for Ideological Shirking.
16: 175-96.
T. J. Miceli
Prison and Parole: Minimizing the Cost of Non-Monetary Sanctions as Deterrents.
16: 197-212.